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Abstract— This paper concerns the TCP (Transmission 
Control Protocol) vulnerabilities which gives space for a 
DoS (Denial of Service) attacks called TCP-SYN flooding 
which is well-known to the community for several years.  
The paper shows this attack in wireless as well as wired 
networks using perl synflood script, Wireshark network 
analyzer server, Windows 2008 server, and OPNET 
simulation environment. Using these tools an effects of this 
attack are shown. Finally, some effective practical 
mitigation techniques against SYN flooding attack for 
Linux and Windows systems are explained. 
Index Terms  - DoS, Flooding, TCP-SYN, Wireshark, OPNET 
Modeler 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays, there are many attacks intended to deprive 
legitimate users from accessing any kind of network resources 
and functions. Any act which denies legitimate use of a 
service can be classed as a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. A 
DoS attacks are major security threats to the services provided 
through the Internet resulting in large scale revenue losses. 
One specific kind of DoS attack which is large-scale 
cooperative attack, typically launched from a large number of 
compromised hosts, is Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS). 
DDoS attacks are bringing about growing threats to businesses 
and Internet providers around the world. While many methods 
have been proposed to counter such attacks, they are either not 
efficient or not effective enough.  
Moreover, the analysis shows that the DDoS attacks which 
use TCP and TCP-SYN flooding are the most prevalent 
among them ([1], [2]). However, flooding DDoS attacks are 
distinct from other attacks, for example, those that execute 
malicious code on their victim. These attacks floods the victim 
with a large volume of traffic and continuous data stream 
disables the victim from providing services to the legitimate 
users. These types of attacks are the mass of all attacking 
packets directed at the victim, which poses the threat, rather 
than the contents of the packets themselves. In that context, 
the Flooding DoS attacks are classified as resource depletion 
form of attacks. Moreover, these types of attacks pose the 
greatest problem in today’s network infrastructures. 
Subverting the use of protocols, such as TCP or UDP, enables 
an attacker to disrupt on-line services by generating a traffic 
overload to block links or cause routers near the victim to 
crash. Considering the TCP-SYN flooding attack, it should be 
mentioned that it is a DoS method affecting hosts that run TCP 
server processes. Although this paper is considering the effects 
of this attack on wireless networks, however considering the 
affected layer from this attack and the way of conducting the 
attack there is no main difference with the wired networks. 
Considering the TCP-SYN flooding attack, as a well-known 
DoS method affecting hosts that run TCP server processes (the 
three-way handshake mechanism of TCP connection), 
nowadays, despite the original one, a lot of variations of it are 
still seen. Although there are many effective techniques 
against TCP-SYN flooding attack exist, and even RFC4987 is 
covering some common mitigation techniques against this 
attack yet there is no single mechanism (schemes) for effective 
defense. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates 
short reviews on TCP-SYN flooding attacks. Moreover, 
Section 3 gives related works in this area. Section 4 describes 
practical demonstration of the TCP-SYN flood attack using 
perl script synflood and Section 5 withdraws some simulation 
results and analysis of the effects of TCP-SYN and DDOS 
TCP-SYN flooding attack. In Section 6 some practical example 
to protect against this type of attack are explained. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes our work. 
II. TCP-SYN FLOODING ATTACKS 
The TCP is connection oriented and reliable, in-sequence 
delivery transport protocol. It provides full duplex stream of 
data octets and it is the main protocol for the Internet. Most 
nowadays services on Internet relay on TCP. For example 
mail (SMTP, port 25), old insecure virtual terminal service 
(telnet, port 23), file transport protocol (FTP, port 21) and 
most important in this case also is the hyper text transfer 
protocol (HTTP, 80) better known as the world wide web 
services (WWW). Almost everything uses TCP someway to 
do their communications over the network - at least the 
interactive ones.  
In TCP-SYN flooding attack, the “SYN” stands for the 
Synchronize flag in TCP headers. The SYN flag gets set when 
a system first sends a packet in a TCP connection, and 
indicates that the receiving system should store the sequence 
number included in this packet. In this kind of flooding attack, 
the focus is given on the Flags, six different bits that may be 
  
sent to represent different conditions, such as initial sequence 
number (SYN), that the acknowledgement field is valid 
(ACK), reset the connection (RST), or close the connection 
(FIN).  
During the TCP-SYN flooding attack [1], the attacking 
system sends TCP-SYN request with spoofed source IP 
address to the victim host. These SYN requests appear to be 
legitimate. The spoofed address refers to a client system that 
does not exist. Hence, the final ACK message will never be 
sent to the victim server system. This results into increased 
number of half-open connections at the victim side. A backlog 
queue is used to store these half-open connections. These half-
open connections bind the resources of the server. Hence, no 
new connections (legitimate) can be made, resulting in DoS or 
DDoS. The victim server is unable to respond to the requests 
for Domain Name System (DNS) service coming from 
legitimate users (this attack is illustrated in Fig. 2). 
Generally in the literature, there are three types of TCP-
SYN flooding attacks, which are going out in the nowadays 
Internet networks: Direct Attack, Spoofing Attack and 
Distributed Direct Attack (see Fig.: 1-3).  
If attackers rapidly send SYN segments without spoofing 
their IP source address, this is assign as a direct attack (Fig. 1). 
This method of attack is very easy to perform because it does 
not involve directly injecting or spoofing packets below the 
user level of the attacker’s operating system. It can be 
performed by simply using many TCP connect() calls, for 
instance. To be effective, however, attackers must prevent 
their operating system from responding to the SYN-ACKS in 
any way, because any ACKs, RSTs, or ICMP messages will 
allow the listener to move the TCB out of SYN-RECEIVED. 
When detected, this type of attack is very easy to defend 
against, because a simple firewall rule to block packets with 
the attacker’s source IP address is all that is needed. This 
defense behavior can be automated, and such functions are 
available in off-the-shelf reactive firewalls. 
Furthermore, TCP-SYN spoofing attacks uses IP address 
spoofing, which might be considered more complex than the 
method used in a direct attack, in that instead of merely 
manipulating local firewall rules, the attacker also needs to be 
able to form and inject raw IP packets with valid IP and TCP 
headers. Moreover, the IP address spoofing techniques can be 
categorized into different types according to what spoofed 
source addresses are used in the attacking packets. 
The three common IP spoofing types are: random 
spoofing, subnet spoofing and fixed spoofing [4].  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  TCP-SYN Flooding: Direct attack 
 
Figure 2.  TCP-SYN Flooding: Spoofing attack 
 
Figure 3.  TCP-SYN Flooding: Distributed direct attack 
In random spoofing, the attacker randomly generates 32-bit 
numbers for use as source addresses of the attacking packets. 
In subnet spoofing, the addresses are generated from the 
address space corresponding to the subnet in which the agent 
machine resides. For example, a machine which is part of the 
194.149.134.0/24 network may spoof any IP address in the 
range from 194.149.134.0 to 194.149.134.255. Another type 
of IP spoofing, called fixed spoofing, chooses source 
addresses from a given list. In this case, the attacker typically 
wants to perform a reflector attack or impose a blame for 
attack on several specific machines.   
Moreover, for spoofing attacks, a primary consideration is 
address selection. If the attack is to succeed, the machines at 
the spoofed source addresses must not respond to the SYN-
ACKs that are sent to them in any way. A very simple attacker 
might spoof only a single source address that it knows will not 
respond to the SYN-ACKs, either because no machine 
physically exists at the IP address presently, or because of 
some other property of the address or network configuration. 
Another option is to spoof many different source addresses, 
under the assumption that some percentage of the spoofed 
addresses will be unrespondent to the SYN-ACKs. This option 
is accomplished either by cycling through a list of source 
addresses that are known to be desirable for the purpose, or by 
generating addresses inside a subnet with similar properties. If 
only a single source address is repetitively spoofed, this 
address is easy for the victim to detect and filter. In most cases 
a larger list of source addresses is used to make defense more 
difficult. In this case, the best defense is to block the spoofed 
packets as close to their source as possible. 
  
Generally, the defense against spoofed flooding traffic, 
especially with subnet spoofing, is really difficult, but in the 
literature can be found several schemes for defense. One of 
them is [5] which is based on a storage-efficient data structure 
and a change-point detection method. Through trace-driven 
simulations, it is shown that this method is accurate and 
efficient to detect the SYN flooding attacks, due to the fact 
that it achieves shorter detection time and small storage space. 
Moreover, in [6] a novel defense mechanism that makes use of 
the edge routers that connect end hosts to the Internet to store 
and detect the outgoing SYN, ACK or incoming SYN/ACK 
segment is proposed. That is accomplished by maintaining a 
mapping table of the outgoing SYN segments and incoming 
SYN/ACK segments and establishing the destination and 
source IP address database. The results of simulation given in 
[6] are showing that the approach can yield accurate DDoS 
flooding attack alarms at early stage. 
On the other hand, assuming the attacker is based in a 
“stub” location in the network (rather than within a transit 
Autonomous System (AS), for instance), restrictive network 
ingress filtering [7] by stub ISPs and egress filtering within the 
attacker’s network will shut down spoofing attacks—if these 
mechanisms can be deployed in the right places. Because 
these ingress/egress filtering defenses may interfere with some 
legitimate traffic, such as the Mobile IP triangle routing mode 
of operation, they might be seen as undesirable, and are not 
universally deployed. Moreover, the IP Security (IPsec) also 
provides an excellent defense against spoofed packets, but this 
protocol generally cannot be required, because its deployment 
is currently limited, and it is usually impossible for the listener 
to ask the initiator’s ISPs to perform address filtering or to ask 
the initiator to use IPsec, defending against spoofing attacks 
that use multiple addresses requires more complex solutions. 
The real limitation of single-attacker spoofing-based 
attacks is that if the packets can somehow be traced back to 
their true source, the attacker can be easily shut down. 
Although the tracing process typically involves some amount 
of time and coordination between ISPs, it is not impossible. A 
distributed version of the SYN flooding attack, in which the 
attacker takes advantage of numerous zombie 
machines/processes throughout the Internet, is much more 
difficult to stop. In the case shown in Fig. 3, the zombies use 
direct attacks, but in order to increase the effectiveness even 
further, each zombie could use a spoofing attack and multiple 
spoofed IP addresses. Currently, distributed attacks are 
feasible because there are several “botnets” or “zombie 
armies” of thousands of compromised machines that are used 
by criminals for DoS attacks. Because zombie machines are 
constantly added or removed from the armies and can change 
their IP addresses or connectivity, it is quite challenging to 
block those types of TCP-SYN flooding attacks. 
III. RELATED WORK 
In the literature there are many methods and frameworks 
which are proposed in order to detect the TCP-SYN flooding 
attacks. The authors of [1] detected the SYN flooding attacks 
at leaf routers that connect end hosts to the Internet, which 
utilizes the normalized difference between the number of 
SYNs packets and the number of FIN (RST) packets in a time 
interval. If the rate of SYNs packets is much higher than that 
of FIN (RST) packets by a non-parametric cumulative sum 
algorithm, the router recognizes that some attacking traffic is 
mixed into the current traffic. Similar work is presented in [8], 
where the fast and effective method for detecting TCP-SYN 
flooding attacks is given. Moreover, a linear prediction 
analysis is proposed as a new paradigm for DoS TCP-SYN 
flooding attack detection. The proposed mechanism makes use 
of the exponential backoff property of TCP used during 
timeouts. By modeling the difference of SYN and SYN&ACK 
packets, it is shown that this approach is able to detect an 
attack within short delays. Again this method is used at leaf 
routers and firewalls to detect the attack without the need of 
maintaining any state. However, considering the fact that the 
sources of attack can be distributed in different networks, 
there is a lack of analysis for the traffic near the sources and 
also the detection of the source of SYN flooding attack in TCP 
based low intensity attacks is missing.  
Moreover, a quite similar (with the previous two papers) 
approach was used in [9], which also considers a non-
parametric cumulative sum algorithm; however the authors 
apply it to measure the number of only SYN packets, and by 
using an exponential weighted moving average for obtaining a 
recent estimate of the mean rate after the change of SYN 
packets. In [10] three counters algorithms for SYN flooding 
defense attacks are given. The three schemes include detection 
and mitigation. The detection scheme utilizes the inherent 
TCP valid SYN–FIN pairs behavior, hence is capable of 
detecting various SYN flooding attacks with high accuracy 
and short response time. The mitigation scheme works in high 
reliable manner for victim to detect the SYN packets of SYN 
flooding attack. Although the given schemes are stateless and 
required low computation overhead, making itself immune to 
SYN flooding attacks, the attackers may retransmit every SYN 
packet more than one time to destroy the mitigation function. 
It is necessary to make it more robust and adaptive.  
In [11], the authors built a standard model generated by 
observations from the characteristic between the SYN packet 
and the SYN+ACK response packet from the server by a 
program for the activity of the server. The authors of [12] 
proposed a method to detect the flooding agents by 
considering all the possible kinds of IP spoofing, which is 
based on the SYN/SYN-ACK protocol pair with the 
consideration of packet header information. The Counting 
Bloom Filter is used to classify all the incoming SYN-ACK 
packets to the sub network into two streams, and a 
nonparametric cumulative sum algorithm is applied to make 
the detection decision by the two normalized differences, with 
one difference between the number of SYN packets and the 
number of the first SYN-ACK packets and another difference 
between the number of the firs SYN-ACK packets and the 
number of the retransmission SYN-ACK. Moreover, in [13] a 
simple and efficient method to detect and defend against TCP-
SYN flooding attacks under different IP spoofing types is 
proposed. The method makes use of a storage-efficient data 
  
structure and a change-point detection method for 
distinguishing complete three-way TCP handshakes from 
incomplete ones. The presented experiments in [13] 
consistently show that their method is both efficient and 
effective in defending against TCP-based flooding attacks 
under different IP spoofing types. However there is a lack of 
autoimmunization of processes within the shame for setting 
the parameters. Additionally, the method is not evaluated in a 
reasonably large real network. 
Moreover, there are also some other related studies such as 
SYN cookies, SYN filtering mechanisms [14], SYN cache, 
SYN proxy (firewall), SYN kill, D-SAT [15] and DiDDeM 
([16] and [17]), and more related studies is in [5], [6], [18] and 
[19]. In the [5] and [6] an early stage detecting method 
(ESDM) is proposed. The ESDM is a simple but effective 
method to detect SYN flooding attacks at the early stage. In 
the ESDM the TCP-SYN traffic is forecasted by 
autoregressive integrated moving average model, and non-
parametric cumulative sum algorithm is used to find the SYN 
flooding attacks according to the forecasted traffic. The 
ESDM achieves shorter detection time and small storage 
space. However, these exiting methods or defense mechanisms 
that against SYN flooding attack are effective only at the later 
stages, when attacking signatures are obvious [6].   
IV. PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE TCP-SYN FLOOD 
ATTACK 
For a practical demonstration of TCP-SYN attack we will 
use the perl script synflood (Fig. 4), and in order to make an 
analysis of traffic during the attack we will use the Wireshark 
tool. 
 
Figure 4.  TCP-SYN flooding attack using perl script synflood  
 
Figure 5.  Traffic analysis using Wireshark network analyzer 
Using the perl script the Wireshark network analyzer server 
is attacked. The attack starts and stops for a short time after 
Wireshark collects a sufficient number of packets for traffic 
analysis (Fig. 5). 
During the traffic analysis in Wireshark it can be noticed 
that the address of the attacker is the same as that of the client 
which means that the client address is spoofed, and it looks 
like the client sends TCP packets to itself i.e., it looks like it 
burdens itself with huge amount packages. 
To demonstrate the consequences of this attack we are login 
into our Windows Server 2008 that has installed DNS role and 
we are attacking it with synflood perl script. Although before 
the attack it is notable that the processor is not burdened at all, 
and the burden on network traffic is very low, however in the 
moment when the attack is executed on port 53 (DNS port) 
(Fig. 6), small increasing on CPU burden on 2008 server can 
be noticed, but very evident is the increase of the burden of 
network bandwidth, which increases over 7Mbps (Fig. 7). We 
must take into consideration that the attack was committed by 
only one machine. It is obvious that in case of attack by 2 or 3 
machines or in case of organized DDoS attack the server 
consequences would be worse, even catastrophic, which 
would cause to be unable to answer on the DNS requests. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Attacking DNS server using perl script synflood 
 
Figure 7.  Resource monitoring after attack 
Immediately after stopping the attack the burden of the 
CPU load and network bandwidth is reduces to its primary 
values. It is necessary to know that realization of this type of 
attack requires a great processing time in order to process 
large amount of packets that are sent to the client, which 
makes understandable the usage of DDoS attacks from 
multiple machines in order to increase processing time for 
packets generation as well as increasing of the network 
bandwidth to send those packages to the client-victim.  
 
  
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS 
OF TCP-SYN AND DDOS TCP-SYN FLOODING ATTACK 
In this section we are going to present our simulation 
experiment on TCP-SYN flooding attack. We have subdivided 
this section into two subsections. We start this section giving 
the configuration of our whole test bed. Then we present 
results we got from specific scenarios. 
A. The Scenario Configuration 
 
Figure 8.  OPNET Scenario 
In order to make a detailed analysis we are considering a 
scenario with three WLAN nodes, where one of them is used 
for simulating data traffic, another for simulating the video and 
the third for voice transmission. The scenario takes place on 
100x100m workspace and it is presented in Fig. 8. For serving 
different requirements (data, video, voice) from different nodes 
we are using a server that is configured to support all the above 
services. The wireless communication is realized via a wireless 
access point. 
In this paper three different scenarios are reviewed: during 
the first scenario there is no attack, during the second scenario 
TCP-SYN flood attack is conducted, and during the third 
scenario we are considering the situation when the network is 
attacked by DDoS TCP-SYN flood attack. In all these 
scenarios as a basis we use the scenario without attack, and 
what changes is the intensity of the attack, which depends on 
the number of attackers. The time of simulation is set to 20 
minutes. We should also mention that examined environment 
presented in this paper is 802.11e capable. 
B. Simulation Results and Analysis 
The average values from the obtained simulation results are 
presented. As results global statistic of the simulated scenario 
is shown. These statistics are scoped to the simulation as a 
whole, in contrast to local statistics, which are scoped to a 
particular queue or processor. In other words, multiple 
processes, as well as pipeline stages, all at different locations 
in the model's system, can contribute to the same shared 
statistic. This is done by referring to the statistic by name and 
obtaining a statistic handle. 
Although from the simulations we obtained a lot of results 
which only confirmed our expectation, however in this paper we 
will present only few of them. Considering the fact that in all 
scenarios there are three legitimate clients with different 
requirements from the server, hereinaftersome of the obtained 
results considering each legitimate node individually are 
explained.  
1) Node: Voice 
 
Figure 9.  Voice Application Jitter 
In Fig. 9 the average voice jitters which occur during voice 
transmission in the situation when no attack is performed and 
when the wireless network is under the TCP-SYN and DDoS 
TCP-SYN Attack is presented. Even the jitter value when 
there is no attack conducted is 0, this value during attacks are 
dramatically increased. Special case is the situation when the 
network/server is attacked by DDoS TCP-SYN Attack which 
is causing higher voice jitter or higher voice packet delay 
variation. 
 
Figure 10.  Voice Application Packet Delay Variation 
The packet delay variation on voice application is shown 
in Fig. 10. This parameter shows the variance among end to 
end delays for voice packets received by this node. End to end 
delay for a voice packet is measured from the time it is created 
to the time it is received. Again, it is noticeable that this delay 
is 10 time higher when TCP-SYN flood attack is committed. 
The situation of DDoS attack is even worse. As it can be seen 
the delay is constantly increasing during this attack  and it is 
  
even incomparable higher than the values from other two 
scenarios. 
2) Node: Video 
 
Figure 11.  Video Application WLAN Delay 
The wireless LAN delay (Fig. 11) represents the end-to-
end delay of all the data packets that are successfully received 
by the WLAN MAC and forwarded to the higher layer. This 
delay includes queuing and medium access delays at the 
source MAC, reception of all the fragments individually, and 
the relay of the frame via AP, if the source and destination 
MACs are non-AP MACs of the same infrastructure BSS. 
Increased number of attackers causes higher delay. 
 
Figure 12.  Video Application WLAN data dropped (buffer overflow) 
Fig. 12 shows higher layer video data traffic dropped (in 
bits/sec) by the WLAN MAC due to full higher layer data 
buffer. In this case during the TCP-SYN flood attack by one 
attacker the value of this parameter is almost the same with the 
scenario without attack. Opposite of this, in the case of DDoS 
attack the number of dropped packets is very high which is 
understandable if we consider that the buffers are filled by 
multiple malicious nodes.  
 
3) Node: Data 
 
Figure 13.  Data TCP segment delay 
Fig. 13 shows the delay (in seconds) of segments received 
by the TCP layer in this node, for all connections. It is 
measured from the time a TCP segment is sent from the source 
TCP layer to the time it is received by the TCP layer in the 
destination node. Using this parameter we collect "TCP 
Delay" statistics for delays experienced by complete 
application packets submitted to TCP. This delay during the 
TCP-SYN flood attack is two time higher than the situation 
without attack, but again the worst case is  the scenario with 
conducted DDoS attack, where the value of TCP segment 
delay is seven time higher than the scenario without attack. 
 
Figure 14.  Data TCP connection aborts (RST sent) 
The parameter TCP connection aborts (RTS Sent) shows 
the total number of TCP connections aborted because the 
maximum number of retransmissions has been reached (Fig. 
14). Statistic is updated each time the connection is abort is 
initiated by the TCP process at this node. The method used by 
OPNET to calculate this parameter is incrementing each time 
a TCP connection is aborted at this node. There is not 
difference from the previous explanations. Against the worst 
case is the situation when the network is attacked by DDoS 
  
attack. Moreover, Fig. 15 shows the TCP load parameter or 
the total number of packets submitted to the TCP layer by the 
application layer in this node, for all connections. 
 
 
Figure 15.  Data TCP Load 
In case of TCP-SYN flood attack this total number of 
packets is reduced on half compared with scenario without 
attack, but situation is much better than the situation when 
DDoS attack is conducted, in which case the number of these 
packets is dramatically reduced. 
VI. PROTECTION AGAINST TCP-SYN FLOOD ATTACK 
The universal answer on the question how to protect against 
TCP-SYN attack is that this type of attack is a very 
problematic issue. 
In the case of TCP-SYN attack, the client does not return a 
response to a SYN / ACK packet, and does not return an ACK 
packet to the server to open connections between the client 
and server. Because of that the server remains with half-
opened connections which are stored in memory, and until the 
timeout expiration the server tries to send a new SYN / ACK 
packet to the client. 
The base problem is the large quantities of generated "half-
opened" connections which server keeps in memory until the 
expiration of their timeout, which can ultimately lead to server 
crash, but nowadays the most common consequence is the 
inability/sluggishness of opening a new connection due to the 
occupancy of the limit for the half-Opened connections. 
Although one of the indicators can be increased CPU time 
and memory, today it will not be visible on the new generation 
of servers, or it will be marginally noticeable. In the case of 
web server what will surely be noticeable, at least at first 
glance, is extremely slow opening of the web pages without 
any "obvious" reasons such as overload of the servers’ 
resources or bandwidth link. 
Netstat command can easily detect whether there is a TCP-
SYN attack. On Linux systems, half-opened connections will 
be marked as SYN_RECV, while on Windows systems they 
will be marked as SYN_RECEIVED. 
Primer (Linux) [20]: 
>netstat -tuna | grep :80 | grep SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 15.55.82.20:1309               SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 51.1.5.7:1743              SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 209.112.192.126:4988 SYN_RECV 
tcp 0 0 192.168.2.1:80 53.12.51.1:1724          SYN_RECV 
… 
This command filters all opened connections per port 80 
(HTTP), and status SYN_RECV (half-opened connection). If 
the output contains a lot of rows that contain SYN_RECV, it 
is likely that a TCP-SYN attack occurred. Consideration 
should be given that filtering IP address, from which the attack 
comes, probably will have no impact on reducing the attack 
because the attacker can easily spoof packets, respectively 
spoofs IP addresses from which an attack is coming. The IP 
addresses in most cases will be related to the actual source of 
the attack. 
Although the ultimate solution to prevent TCP-SYN flood 
attack is very complex issue, it is possible to perform the basic 
actions that will reduce the impact of this attack. 
In Chapter 3 we already mentioned several proposed 
effective mechanisms for detection and prevention against this 
type of attack. Even more, some effective solutions against 
this attack are considered in RFC 4987 [21]. Anyway, in this 
section we are considering a practical approach to mitigate the 
effects of SYN flood attack. 
LINUX: Enabling SYN Cookies function within the Linux 
kernel will allow "ignoring" of the TCP-SYN flood attacks, 
allowing the server to stop the half-opened connections when 
they fill their limit. While the connection will be terminated, 
the server will send a SYN / ACK packet to the client, and if it 
receives an ACK response from the client it will reconstruct 
the previous half-opened connection, and enable 
communication with the client. 
To enable SYN cookies inside the kernel the following 
actions should be taken: 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1 
In order to enable SYN cookies during every restart it is 
necessary to edit/etc/sysctl.conf, and enter into a new row: 
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 
It is recommended to increase the SYN backlog queue with 
a default value of 1024 to 2048: 
sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog=2048 
To set options for each server restart is necessary to 
edit/etc/sysctl.conf, and enter into a new row: 
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 2048 
In the case of TCP-SYN attacks in the logs the following 
should occur, but despite the attack server will still be able to 
normally open a new connection toward the customers. 
[1116377.589736] possible SYN flooding on port 80. Sending cookies. 
[1116439.567828] possible SYN flooding on port 80. Sending cookies. 
[1116500.631623] possible SYN flooding on port 80. Sending cookies. 
WINDOWS: In order to configure TCP-SYN flood protection 
for Windows 2000 and 2003 servers several registry entries 
should be set (Table 1). 
First step is to enable SYN attack protection. 
SynAttackProtect defines whether it is included TCP-SYN 
flood protection, and if the value is 0 then it is disabled, which 
  
means that it should be set to the value 1 for better or value 2 
for best protection against TCP-SYN flood attack [22]. 
TABLE I.  CONFIGURING REGISTRY ENTRIES 
Registry Path NAME VALUE 
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SynAttackProtect 2 
TcpMaxPortsExhausted 5 
TcpMaxHalfOpen 500 
TcpMaxHalfOpenRetried 400 
TcpMaxConnectResponseRetransmissions 2 
TcpMaxDataRetransmissions 2 
EnablePMTUDiscovery 0 
KeepAliveTime 300000 
 
A denial of service (DoS) attack against Windows servers is 
to send it a "name release" command. This will cause it to 
release its NetBIOS, preventing clients from accessing the 
machine. By setting NoNameReleaseOnDemand with registry 
path KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ 
Services\NetBT\Parameters to DWORD "1" instead of the 
default "0", other machines will be prevented from causing the 
protected system's name from being released. 
Using the TcpMaxPortsExhausted, TCPMaxHalfOpen 
TCPMaxHalfOpenRetried it is possible to define values, 
primarily limits of the possible number of half-opened 
connections. Within 2008/ Vista/7 Windows the protection 
from the TCP-SYN flood attacks is turned on for by default, 
and cannot be excluded. For Windows 2008 servers it is 
possible to apply an increase in CPU and memory load, 
because the server releases the half-opened connections 
depending on system load. Manually adjustment option as in 
Windows 2003 Server is not possible, but the server adapts the 
configuration to current needs / conditions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper one of the vulnerabilities of TCP protocol 
which leads to the TCP-SYN flooding DoS attack is shown. 
Furthermore a practical demonstration of the effects of this 
attack using perl script, synflood and Wireshark network 
analyzer server, as well as Windows Server 2008 is presented. 
To confirm the results from the practical demonstration and to 
see the effects of the TCP-SYN flood attack and DDoS TCP-
SYN flood attack on other parameters on different types of 
traffic (voice, video, data) in 802.11e environment we used 
OPNET Modeler simulation tool. The results we obtained are 
as we expected to be. Namely, during the TCP-SYN flooding 
attack the situation with all network parameters became worse, 
but even this results are incomparable with the dramatically 
deteriorated results obtained during the simulation of the last 
scenario when DDoS TCP-SYN flood have been conducted. 
Finally, we have given some practical example for mitigating 
the effects of TCP-SYN flood DoS attack in Linux and 
Windows environment. 
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